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This paper is concerned with the role of education as a determinant of health care 
choices. The central premise of the paper is that utilization of health services is 
determined not solely by an individual’s own education, but rather by a notion of 
effective education, which incorporates the educational attainment of other household 
members. The paper sets out a general framework for representing intrahousehold 
education externalities, and proposes a number of specific hypotheses concerning the 
way in which the education of different household members affects health care 
choices. These hypotheses are tested on data from Mozambique, focusing on 
maternity services and child immunizations. We draw five major conclusions from the 
analysis. First, while maternal education seems to be the education variable of 
primary importance for the health care choices under consideration, the education of 
other household members has a significant and sometimes large effect. Second, the 
analysis suggests that while the education of the person (nonspouse) in the household 
with the highest-level education is important, the level of education of additional 
household members does not have an impact on health care choices. Third, the data 
provide no evidence of a gender difference in education externalities. Fourth, we 
examine the merits of two alternative representations of the education externality, but 
are unable to conclude unambiguously in favor of one specification over the other. 1 
 
1.  Introduction 
This paper is concerned with the role of education in choices about maternity 
care and child immunizations. The correlation between education and utilization of 
health services is well established in the literature (see Strauss and Thomas 1995). 
Traditionally, empirical analysis has focused on the educational attainment of the 
person seeking care or, in the case of child health, on maternal education. For 
maternity care, this is motivated by health care choices being conceived as individual 
decisions. For child health, the literature has paid attention to both maternal and 
paternal education, but many contributors have argued that maternal education is of 
particular importance (Caldwell 1979), and this has been confirmed empirically in 
many contexts (see Bicego and Boerma 1993).
1 
The focus on individual or maternal education, however, offers only a partial 
picture of the role of education in decisionmaking. Education proxies for information, 
cognitive skills, and values (Schultz 1984). These features of education are a public 
good within a household, or can at least be expected to bring external benefits to other 
household members. This may operate, for example, through complementarities in 
knowledge and information between different individuals. The notion of 
intrahousehold education externalities raises both conceptual questions about how to 
model the broader effects of education in the decisionmaking process, and empirical 
questions about the importance of external effects. In particular, beyond the woman’s 
own education, does the educational attainment of other household members—spouse 
and nonspouse—have an impact on health care choices? 
The paper makes three main contributions. First, it offers a general framework 
for analyzing intrahousehold education externalities and their effect on decisions 
relating to health care. Second, on the basis of a general framework for analyzing the 
utilization of health services, it presents empirical evidence from Mozambique 
concerning the impact of education externalities on childhood immunizations and the 
utilization of reproductive health services. Finally, it provides some tentative 
conclusions concerning rival specifications of the conditioning education variables. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the literature on 
which the analytical and empirical approach is based. Section 3 presents a framework 
for representing education externalities and also outlines the empirical approach. 
Section 4 describes the data and key variables in the analysis. Section 5 reports on key 
findings from the empirical analysis. Section 6 concludes. 
2.  Related Literature 
The paper is located at the intersection of two strands of the literature. First, it 
relates to a broad literature on human capital investments and health production 
concerned with the demand for health care and the determinants of health outcomes. 
This literature provides both a theoretical grounding for the role of education in health 
care demand and empirical evidence of its importance. Second, the paper draws on a 
                                                 
1 Caldwell (1979) argued that maternal education is important because it (a) reduces fatalism in 
relation to health; (b) conveys a greater capacity of manipulating the world (e.g., knowing how and 
when to visit health care facilities); and (c) represents a change in the traditional balance of familial 
relationships. 2 
 
growing literature on education externalities and their impact on behavior and 
outcomes.  
2.1  The Effect of Education On Health Care Choices 
There is a broad array of approaches to study the utilization of health services 
in developing countries. A sizeable anthropological literature has emphasized the role 
of beliefs, attitudes, and perceptions on health-related behavior. For developing 
countries, much of this literature has focused on traditional medical practices. 
However, there have also been a number of studies concerning the use and nonuse of 
allopathic (“modern”) medicine. By focusing on issues relating to sequencing, 
perceptions of complementarity between different sources of care, and the role of 
norms, rules, and beliefs in the area of health, these studies have highlighted the 
complexity of decisionmaking processes in relation to health (see, Ryan 1981, 1998; 
Ryan and Martinez 1996). 
In contrast, following Grossman (1972a; 1972b), much of the economic 
analysis of health care decisions has been based on a human capital framework, in 
which health features directly as an argument in the utility function, and is produced 
in the home through the combination of purchased inputs and time (Becker 1965). 
Hence, this literature has emphasized the importance of preferences, prices (including 
shadow prices), and technology, and has highlighted the tradeoffs between the costs 
of investments in health and the alternative uses of those resources. Health services 
comprise an important health investment. The costs associated with the utilization of 
health services include direct monetary costs for consultations, tests, and medication 
(and possibly internment), but also indirect (monetary and nonmonetary) costs such as 
foregone income and costs associated with not performing normal activities (paid 
work, unpaid agricultural or house work, tending to children), and transport costs. 
Whether these costs are worth incurring depends on both preferences and the 
technology by which health inputs are transformed into health outcomes.  
The human capital framework suggests a number of reasons why the 
utilization of health services (or human capital investments in general) are likely to be 
influenced by education. The effects operate through many channels. In part, this is 
due to the multidimensional nature of the concept of educational outcome or 
achievement, which includes basic and complex cognitive skills, general knowledge, 
technical skills, and norms and values (Glewwe 2000). In this sense it may be 
inappropriate to speak of the effect of education on the demand for health inputs. 
However, ambiguities about the effect of education also stem from theory, which 
suggests complex paths of influence. These include (a) efficiency (more educated 
individuals are better at choosing an appropriate mix of health inputs), (b) technology 
(more educated individuals make more effective use of health inputs), (c) preferences 
(education conveys values and norms related to the perceived value of health), (d) 
income (higher education is associated with higher income and greater demand for 
health), (e) substitution (education raises the opportunity cost of time and will result 
in a shift away from labor intensive home production) (Schultz 1984). In general, 
theory does not offer unambiguous conclusions about the impact of education on the 
demand for health inputs, thus pointing to the need for an empirical analysis.  
Empirical work on the impact of education (and other individual, household, 
and community factors) has focused on both health outcomes and the demand for 3 
 
health inputs.
2 Most studies have found that higher education, in particular maternal 
education, results in improved child health (in terms of child mortality and child 
nutrition), although these findings are not unambiguous (Barrera 1990; Benefo and 
Schulz 1996; Bicego and Boerma 1993; Caldwell 1979; Desai and Alva 1998; 
Glewwe 1999; Hobcraft 1993; Hossain 1989; Lavy and others 1996; Wolfe and 
Behrman 1982, 1984). The relationship between education and health operates 
primarily through the impact of education on proximate determinants of health, such 
as feeding and health practices, sanitation, and utilization of health services. This 
mechanism has also been studied empirically. For example, studies have focused on 
the impact of education on food nutrient intake and sanitary practices (Cebu Study 
Team 1991), use and timing of prenatal health services (Behrman and Wolfe 1987; 
Gertler, Rahman, and Feifer 1993; Guilkey and Riphahn 1998; Panis and Lillard 
1994; Pebley, Goldman, and Rodriguez 1996; Sandiford and others 1995; Schwartz 
and others 1988; Wong and others 1987), and child immunizations (Gage, 
Sommerfelt, and Piani 1997; Guilkey and Riphahn 1998; Steele, Diamond, and Amin 
1996; Streatfield, Singarimbun, and Diamond 1990). Many of these studies also find 
education to be an important determinant.
3 Again, maternal education is often found 
to be more important than paternal education.
4 The primary importance of maternal 
education for child health outcomes and the use of health care services may be due to 
social and cultural factors, whereby there are gender differences in preferences or in 
the information and skills acquired through education. Alternatively, importance of 
maternal education may reflect the concentration of benefits from investment in 
maternal and child health on the mother. 
The empirical analysis of these issues is fraught with problems, and these 
findings are not uncontested. Many studies do not adequately control for 
unobservables such as individual and household background and school 
characteristics. For example, there may be common unobservables—preferences or 
abilities—that determines both the amount of education acquired and human capital 
outcomes (Behrman and Wolfe 1987; Desai and Alva 1998; Hobcraft 1993). 
Similarly, for some issues, educational attainment or at least health knowledge may 
respond endogenously to unobserved health endowments. Although these factors may 
lead to bias in some contexts if not addressed in the analysis, there seems to be a 
general consensus that education is an important determinant of the demand for health 
inputs, including the utilization of health services (Strauss and Thomas 1995). 
2.2 Intrahousehold  Education  and Literacy Externalities 
As noted, the focus on maternal education as the primary variable of interest 
in the analysis of health service use and child health may be justified on the basis of a 
                                                 
2 For reviews see  Behrman and Deolalikar (1988), Schultz (1999) and Strauss and Thomas 
(1995; 1998). 
3 In these studies education is typically measured by years of schooling or highest grade attained. 
These are, however, likely to be poor proxies for educational achievement, which is the product of a 
complex combination of educational inputs, including, years in school, daily attendance, grade 
repetition, home support and tuition, household expenditure on schooling supplies, school 
characteristics, and so forth. A few studies that have tried to assess the relative importance of different 
dimensions of educational achievement (specific knowledge, cognitive skills, norms and values). 
Glewwe (1999) and Thomas, Strauss, and Henriques (1990) comprise important exceptions. 
4 The exception is breast-feeding, where better educated women are less likely to breast feed, and 
tend to breast feed for a shorter period (Cebu Study Team 1991; Wolfe and Behrman 1982). 4 
 
priori assumptions about gender differences in preferences, or about gender 
specificities in the knowledge and information conveyed by education. However, the 
sole focus on own education in the analysis of health care demand is at odds with 
evidence on more general intrahousehold education externalities.  
The idea that the education or literacy of one individual can bring benefits for 
other individuals in his or her proximity—through assistance with administrative 
tasks or decisionmaking—is not new. The possibility of such externalities has been 
recognized and studied in a range of different areas, including agricultural innovation 
(Green, Rich and Nesman 1985), farm productivity (Foster and Rosenzweig 1996), 
labor earnings (Basu, Narayan, and Ravallion 2002), and child health (Gibson 1999).
5 
The possibility of literacy externalities has also given rise to a literature on how 
literacy ought to be measured (Basu and Foster 1998; Basu, Foster, and Subramanian. 
2001; Subramanian 2001). Specifically, Basu and Foster (1998) propose that 
intrahousehold externalities from literacy should be taken into account in the 
measurement of literacy. In order to do so, they distinguish between isolated 
illiterates—illiterate individuals in households where no one is literate—and 
proximate illiterates, who live in households where at least one person is literate. On 
this basis, they put forward an alternative indicator, the effective literacy rate that 
takes this distinction into account. This is based on the idea that each proximate 
literate can be considered to have a level of literacy of α (0<α<1), compared to 0 for 
isolated literates and 1 for literates. The effective literacy rate is simply the population 
mean of this “corrected” literacy variable. 
The Basu and Foster (1998) framework provides a basis for the empirical 
analysis of literacy externalities.
6 However, as they recognize, the basic framework 
abstracts from a number of issues. In particular, the externality may be both issue and 
person specific. In other words, the impact of another household member’s literacy on 
behavior or outcomes may depend both on who holds the education and who is 
benefiting from the externality. This may, for example, be due to gender biases in the 
production of literacy or education externalities, such that the presence of a literate or 
educated woman in the household has a greater impact on the function of other 
household members than the presence of an educated or literate man. Moreover, Basu 
and Foster (1998) restrict attention to literacy. But educational achievement is likely 
to have an impact on behavior and outcomes beyond literacy. This then calls for a 
more general framework. 
3.  Analytical Framework and Empirical Approach 
3.1 Modeling  Intrahousehold Education Externalities 
Basu and Foster (1998) propose a framework where every household, h, can 
be characterized by a literacy profile,  ) ,..., , ( 2 1
h
n
h h h x x x = x . According to the standard 
conception of literacy,  1 =
h
i x  if the individual is literate, and  0 =
h
i x  otherwise. In the 
presence of literacy externalities, however,  ) 0 ( , > = α α
h
i x  for proximate literates—
                                                 
5 The focus on intrahousehold dynamics in health care choices also highlights the potential role 
education plays in changing the relative autonomy and bargaining power of different household 
members. This issue is not explored in the paper. 
6 For example, using a model of children’s height-for-age in Papua New Guinea (PNG), Gibson 
(1999) finds an estimate of 0.76 for the intrahousehold externality from living in the same household 
as a literate individual α. 5 
 
illiterate individuals living in the same household as a literate individual.
7 In contrast 
to the case of literacy externalities, the analysis of education externalities is 
complicated by the fact that education, unlike literacy, is not a binary variable. As a 
consequence, the externality may be a function of the level of education, and may 
depend on the level of education of both the source and the recipient of the 
externality.  
Following the general notation of Basu and Foster (1998), consider a 
household with the education profile  ) ,..., , ( 2 1
h
n
h h e e e =
h e , where we can think of 
h
i e  as 
numbers of years of schooling, highest grade attained, or some other proxy for 
educational attainment of individual i. We denote the effective level of education of 
individual i as 






i e f e , where  
  } : { i k e
h
k ≠ ∀ ∈ ≡ −
h h
i e e , 
and θ is some parameter vector. The effective level of education incorporates 
intrahousehold education externalities, thus representing the full set of information, 
values, and cognitive abilities that individual i can bring to bear on any 
decisionmaking process. In other words, 
h
i e  is a function not only of the level of 
education of individual i, but also the education of other household members.
8  
It is difficult to represent specific hypotheses concerning education 
externalities on the basis of this general specification. Hence, in order to guide the 
empirical analysis we consider the case where 
h
i e  can be represented as a linear 
function of the level of education of the different household members. On this basis, 
we can represent both the absence of education externalities, the case of general 
education externalities, and three cases of specific education externalities. 
 
(A)   Education is a pure private good. It is possible to conceive of education, and 
the information, knowledge, and values that it conveys, as a bringing benefits 
solely to the educated individual. In other words, there are no intrahousehold 
externalities from education, and the decisions relating to health care are only 
influenced by the education of the individual making the choice. In this case, 




i ∈ ∀ = . 
(B)  General intrahousehold education externalities. There may be a general 
education externalities for i from the education of other household members. 
These may, as noted, be due to complementarity effects, whereby the 
information or knowledge of other members of the household may fill gaps in 
the information or knowledge of individual i. Alternatively, these externalities 
may arise due to the dialectic nature of the decision process concerning health 
care, where different members are consulted and have an input in the 
decisionmaking. In both these cases, externalities may arise even if the other 
                                                 
7 On this basis, the effective literacy rate is r
*=(L+αP)/N, where L is the number of literate 
individuals in the population, P is the number of proximate literate individuals, and N is the total 
population. 
8 Individuals outside the household that form part of an individual’s social network may also 
influence his or her effective level of education. This possibility is not explored further here. 6 
 
household members have a lower level of education than i. With this general 
externality, the effective level of education of i is  







i e e e α . 
(C)  Specific education externalities. There are also some more specific 
possibilities that are nested in this general framework.  
 
(C1)  There may be education externalities for i from the education of k, where 
these are contingent on k being the spouse or partner of i. This would be 
the case, for example, if education complementarities arise exclusively or 
primarily in the relationship between spouses. In this case, the effective 
level of education is 
  ) ( ,
2 1 ∑− + + =
i
h






i e d e e e α α , where  
  i k k
i k






spouse   s '   is if 1
, i  .  
 
(C2)  There may be education externalities for i from the education of k, where 
these are contingent on k being a woman. This would be consistent with 
the case where education complementarities in relation to decisions about 
reproductive or child health arise exclusively or primarily in the 
relationship between women, such that, 
  ) ( ,
2 1 ∑− + + =
i
h






i e d e e e α α , where  
  i k k
k
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, i  . 
 
(C3) There may be education externalities for i from the education of other 
household members, where these are contingent on k has a higher level of 
education than i. This would be consistent with the case where the choice 
of individual i is primarily a function of his or her education, but where it 
is possible to make use of the additional knowledge or information of 
another household member. In this case, the effective level of education is 
  ) ( ,
2 1 ∑− + + =
i
h






i e d e e e α α , where  















, i  . 
3.2  Empirical Approach: Modeling, Estimation, and Hypothesis Testing 
In a static framework of health care demand (Gertler, Locay, and Sanderson 
1987; Gertler and van der Gaag 1990), a woman’s choice between use and nonuse of 
maternity and child health services can be cast in a simple random utility model. The 
utility of the two alternatives (service use (s) and nonuse (ns)) are  
  ) ; , , ( s s s s
s x h U U φ ε =  and  ) ; , , ( ns ns ns ns
ns x h U U φ ε = , 7 
 
where, h is health status, x is a vector of nonhealth (residual) consumption, ε is a 
random error term, and ϕ is a parameter vector. Nonhealth consumption, x, is a 
function of exogenous income, y, the total cost of care (including both direct and 
indirect costs), c. Health status (hs and hns), in turn, can be represented as  
  ) ; , ( s s h h β e z =  and  ) ; , ( ns ns h h β e z = , 
where z is a vector of individual, household, community, and health care provider 
characteristics, e is a vector of variables that determine the effective level of 
education, and βs,ns are parameter vectors. The health care choice is represented by 
the indicator function 
  ] [ 1 ns s U U S > = . 
The essential feature of the model concerns the tradeoff between health and 
nonhealth consumption. This tradeoff arises as long as xs<xns and hs>hns. In order to 
operationalize this general analytical framework, we must be more specific about 
functional form. Following the early literature on health care demand in developing 
countries (Akin and others 1984, 1986; Mwabu 1986), the empirical specification is 
based on a linear utility and health production function, such that  
  s s s s s
s x h U ε ϕ ϕ + + = 2 1  and  ns ns ns ns ns
ns x h U ε ϕ ϕ + + = 2 1 , and 








ns ns h + = .
9 
In line with the representation of education externalities set out above, the 
vector e is assumed to contain (a) the highest grade completed by the woman, (b) the 
highest grade completed by her spouse (if present), and (c) the highest grade 
completed by other members of the household (if present). In order to keep the 
empirical specification manageable, it is assumed that decisions relating to the use of 
health services can be influenced by the education of up to three other household 
members (Oth1, Oth2, and Oth3).
10 To distinguish cases where a particular household 
member (spouse or “other”) is not present from the case where he or she is present but 
does not have any formal education, the model includes dummy variables indicating 
who is present in the household. For “other” household members the model also 
includes an interaction term, where educational attainment is interacted with whether 
the person is a woman or not. This permits testing of whether the presence of 
educated women in the household has a greater impact on health care decisions than 
the presence of educated men. In summary,  
                                                 
9 Gertler and van der Gaag (1990) and Dow (1996) have noted considerable weaknesses with this 
specification. In particular, it does not permit the price elasticity of demand to be a function of income. 
However, given the focus of this paper, the simpler specification is adequate. 
10 It is assumed that the educational attainment of other household members with the highest level 
of education is most likely to be important. In other words, the other household members are sorted by 
educational attainment, such that for all household members (>13 years), Oth1Edu ≥ Oth2Edu ≥ 
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Finally, we assume that nonhealth consumption is a function of exogenous 
income and travel time, such that  
  Time y x s s s 2 1 γ γ − =  and  Time y x ns ns ns 2 1 γ γ − = . 
Using the linear functions for h and x in the utility function, and with an 
appropriate reparametrization, 
  ] ' [ s s
s U U ε + = w α  and  ] ' [ ns ns

























On this basis, the probability that the woman uses the particular health service 
is 
  ] Pr[ ] ) Pr[( ] Pr[ ] 1 Pr[ ε U U S s ns ns s
ns s > = − > − = > = = αw w α α w ε ε , where 9 
 
  )   and   ( s ns ε ε ε − = − = ns s α α α . 
Under the assumption that ε ∼ N(0,1),  
  ) ' ( ] ' Pr[ ] ' Pr[ ] 1 Pr[ w α w α w α w Φ = < = > = = ε ε S , 
where Φ is the standard normal distribution. This is the Probit model. Under 
appropriate regularity conditions, the parameter vector α can be estimated 
consistently using maximum likelihood techniques. This approach will further permit 
us to perform a series of hypothesis tests concerning single and joint restrictions on 
the coefficients of interest (summarized in Table 1). It is important to note that due to 
the inherent nonlinearities of the Probit model, these tests do not actually tell us 
whether a particular variable (or set of variables) has a significant impact on the 
probability of a woman seeking care. In other words, the estimated coefficients (and 
associated standard errors) concern the marginal effect of the independent variables 
on the index, α‘w, not the predicted probabilities. With this in mind, we also report 
the impact of the variables of interest on choice probabilities.  
Table 1. Tests of Restrictions on the Estimated Coefficients 
Provided that a woman has a spouse, and controlling for the 
educational attainment of other household members, the highest 
grade attained by the spouse has a significant marginal effect on 
women’s health care decisions relating to maternity and child 
health services. 
SpouseEdu = 0 
Provided that there are other members of the household over 13 
years of age, and controlling for the educational attainment of 
the spouse, the highest grade attained by these household 
members have a significant marginal effect on women’s health 
care health care decisions. 
Oth1Edu = 
Oth1Edu + (Oth1Edu x Female) = 
Oth2Edu = 
Oth2Edu + (Oth2Edu x Female) = 
Oth3Edu = 
Oth3Edu + (Oth3Edu x Female) = 0 
Provided that there are other members of the household over 13 
years of age, and controlling for the educational attainment of 
the spouse and the “other” person in the household with the 
highest level of education, the grade attained by further 
household members has a significant marginal effect on 
women’s health care health care decisions. 
Oth2Edu = 
Oth2Edu + (Oth2Edu x Female) = 
Oth3Edu = 
Oth3Edu + (Oth3Edu x Female) = 0 
Provided that there are other individuals in the household over 
13 years of age, the marginal effect of the highest grade 
attained on women’s health care decisions is different 
depending on whether the other individuals are men or women 
(Oth1, Oth2 and Oth3). 
Oth1Edu x Female = 
Oth2Edu x Female = 
Oth3Edu x Female = 0 
Provided that there are other individuals in the household over 
13 years of age, the marginal effect of the highest grade 
attained on women’s health care decisions is different 
depending on whether the other individuals are men or women 
(Oth2 and Oth3). 
Oth2Edu x Female = 
Oth3Edu x Female = 0 
 
Finally, in setting out alternative representations of the effective level of 
education, we proposed as one hypothesis that education externalities may arise only 
if the recipient of the externality has a lower level of education than the source. For 
women’s health care choices, the education of others would, under this hypothesis, be 
more important if the level of education of the woman is low relative to the other 
household member. This possibility cannot be straightforwardly nested in the general 
empirical specification. Instead, we explore two related (although not necessarily 
consistent) ways of testing for this possibility. First, we test whether the coefficients 10 
 
on the education variables of interest, estimated over the set observations of women 
with no formal education, are the same as those estimated over the set of observations 
of women with some formal education. Second, we introduce an alternative 
specification of the education variables, where the level of education of the spouse 
and other household members is measured as the deviation from the woman’s 
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As this specification cannot be represented as a restricted version of the 
original model, a test for non-nested models is performed. 
4.  Data and Variables 
The empirical analysis is based on the 1996/97 Mozambique National 
Household Survey on Living Conditions (IAF).
11 The survey was designed and 
implemented by the National Statistics Institute in Mozambique, and was conducted 
from February 1996 to April 1997. The sample was selected in three stages and is 
geographically stratified to ensure representativeness at both the provincial level and 
for urban/rural areas. The overall sample consists of 39,961 individuals in 7,920 
households.
12 For the analysis of maternity services, the relevant subsample consists 
of women between 12 and 49 years old who report having delivered a child in the 12 
months preceding the survey (1,584 individuals in 1,509 households). Conversely, the 
analysis of childhood immunizations is based on the subsample of children between 
12 and 48 months old (3,647 individuals in 3,046 households).
13 However, for the 
decisions concerning immunizations, the education variable of primary interest relates 
to the mother or guardian. As some women have more than one child in the relevant 
age group, the subsample of mothers or guardians is smaller than the relevant 
subsample of children (3,113 individuals).
14  
                                                 
11 Inquérito Nacional aos Agregados Familiares Sobre as Condições de Vida (IAF). Details 
concerning the survey can be found in Datt and others (2000) and Ministry of Planning and Finance 
(1998). 
12 Given that the research focuses on intrahousehold relationships, we opted to drop complete 
households when relevant data were missing for any of the individuals in the household. 
Approximately 6 percent of the original sample was dropped for this reason. 
13 The analysis focuses on whether children have received a complete set of immunizations. 
Children under 12 months are therefore excluded. Moreover, considering that some of the independent 
variables are time-variant, it is important to limit the time-gap between the measurement of the 
outcome and of the independent variables. With this in mind, children between 48 and 60 months old 
were excluded from the subsample. 
14 For most children, the mother is residing in the household. In cases where the mother is absent, 
the spouse of the head of household (or the head of household in the case of a female head) is assigned 11 
 
Health Service Outcomes  
The three health service outcomes of interest in this paper are measured as 
binary variables, indicating whether a particular service was used or not. First, women 
(between the age of 12 and 49) who report having delivered a child in the last 12 
months were asked whether they had attended any pregnancy controls, and whether 
they delivered their child in a hospital, health center, or maternity clinic. Second, in 
households with children under five years of age, respondents were asked about the 
number of doses of polio, DTP, measles, and BCG vaccinations that each child has 
received. A child is considered fully immunized if he/she has received three doses 
each of polio and DTP, and one dose each of measles and BCG. Subsample means for 
the relevant dependent variables are reported in Table 2. 
Table 2. Health Service Outcomes 




subsample  n 
Percent of 
sample 
Women had pregnancy control during last pregnancy (last 
12 months)  63.81 1,584  4.31 
Women delivered child in hospital or health center (last 12 
months)  40.09 1,584  4.31 
Children more than 12 months but less than 48 months old 
fully immunized  45.41 3,647  9.18 
n=39,961      
Characterizing Household Education and Structure  
Both female education and the education of other household members feature 
as key variables in the analysis. Education is measured by the highest grade of 
schooling completed. Under the current educational system in Mozambique, primary 
education is comprised of the first seven grades. It is subdivided in to two levels, with 
EP1 (Escola Primária 1) covering the first five years, and the EP2 (Escola Primária 
2) covering the following two years. Many of the children who start primary 
education only complete one or two years before dropping out. Secondary education 
is offered in secondary, technical, and agricultural schools. It is only a small 
proportion of students from primary education go on to this level. Of these, a large 
proportion receive basic technical education lasting for three years. However, in order 
to enter tertiary education it is necessary to complete five full years of general 
secondary school.
15 
Data on educational attainment for the sample as a whole and for the relevant 
subsamples are summarized in Table 3. A large proportion of the Mozambican 
population has no formal education. This is particularly true for women. In 1997, less 
then 20 percent of the population had completed the first level of primary education 
(12.3 percent for women), and only a very small proportion had received any form of 
secondary education. The educational characteristics of the women in the respective 
sub-samples appear similar to that of women in the sample as whole (in the relevant 
                                                                                                                                            
as the primary guardian. If such a person was not present in the household, the child was matched with 
the oldest female household member. 
15 This brief characterization of the Mozambican educational system refers to its current structure. 
Many of the individuals in the sample attended school during the colonial era, or prior to the 
educational reform that created the current system. Data on grades completed can therefore not be 
straightforwardly mapped onto levels of the educational system. 12 
 
age group). As expected, there is a strong relationship between the woman’s 
education and the health service outcomes of interest (see Figure 1 in appendix).  















No  education  44.14 28.97 57.92  53.32  55.56 
Year  1  7.44 7.05 7.79  7.84  7.96 
Year 2  9.60  10.87  8.44  7.52  10.53 
Year 3  9.51  12.39  6.90  7.75  6.25 
Year 4  10.64  15.04  6.65  8.89  7.60 
Year  5  6.72 8.45 5.14  6.63  5.05 
Year  6  5.28 7.49 3.27  3.60  3.50 
Year  7  2.86 4.09 1.74  2.25  1.43 
Year  8  1.35 1.87 0.87  1.18  0.80 
Year  9  1.20 1.70 0.75  0.68  0.89 
Year 10 or higher  1.26  2.07  0.50  0.36  0.46 
n 22,670  10,685  11,985  1,584  3,113 
* Subsample1: Women who delivered a child in the last 12 months. 
** Subsample 2: Mother or guardian of children aged 1-3. 
However, the central question in this paper is whether the level of education of 
other household members also has an impact on outcomes (summary statistics of the 
relevant variables are provided in Table 4). Approximately 80 percent of the women 
in the respective samples have a spouse residing in the household. In the majority of 
these cases, the spouse has a higher level of education than the woman. The spouse is 
however not the only person that may influence health service outcomes. Indeed most 
women live in households with one or more other adult (>15 years) person. The 
average level of education of these “other” individuals is lower than for the spouse, 
yet it is far from unusual that someone other than the woman or the spouse has the 
highest level of education in the household.  
Controls in the Analysis 
Five types of variables are included as controls in the analysis.
16 First, we seek 
to control for key characteristics of the health care supply. Specifically, the analysis 
includes variables relating to travel time, the accessibility of primary health care 
providers (proxied by the transitability of roads and the regularity of public transport 
in the community), and the existence of a hospital in the district. Health care quality is 
proxied by the deviation of district-level spending from a norm based on 
infrastructure characteristics, staffing, and the activity level in district. Second, 
household level determinants include household size and two proxies for the 
economic situation of the household (per capita consumption and an indicator 
variable for whether anyone in the household has a profession). Third, some of the 
characteristics of the woman comprise important controls in the analysis, including 
her age, and variables indicating her relationship with the head of household, whether 
she is married (in part to control for cases where woman has a spouse that does not 
reside in the household), whether she working, and whether she has a profession (as 
proxies for economic independence). Fourth, for the analysis of child immunizations, 
two indicator variables for the child’s relation to the head of household, and for 
                                                 
16 All variables described fully in appendix Table A1, Table A2, and Table A3). 13 
 
whether he/she is the first child are included. Finally, the estimation uses provincial-
level fixed effects to control for unmeasured spatial differences, including the supply 
of health services and in norms and values. 
Table 4. Educational Characteristics of Households 






Highest grade attained by woman (mean)  1.72  1.54 
Someone in household has higher level of education than woman (%)  66.17  65.86 
Spouse    
Present: woman has spouse (%)  80.20  80.67 
Highest grade attained by spouse (mean)  2.55  2.55 
Spouse has higher level of education than woman (%)  48.41  49.64 
Oth1: “Other” person with highest level of education     
Present: someone other than spouse in household older than 15  55.96 60.37 
Highest grade attained (mean)  1.73  1.80 
Other person has higher level of education than woman (%)  30.75  33.00 
Oth2: “Other” person with second highest level of education     
Present (%)  38.09  39.12 
Highest grade attained (mean)  0.86  0.87 
Other person has higher level of education than woman (%)  13.73  15.37 
Oth3: “Other” person with third highest level of education     
Present (%)  23.79  24.10 
Highest grade attained (mean)  0.43  0.41 
Other person has higher level of education than woman (%)  5.55  6.66 
N  1,584 3,113 
* Subsample1: Women who delivered a child in the last 12 months. 
** Subsample 2: Mother or guardian of children aged 1-3. 
5.  Findings 
This section summarizes the results from the empirical analysis.
17 Although 
the issue of primary interest concerns the effect of education on health care choices, 
we begin by summarizing the findings for the controls in the analysis (full Probit 
results are reported in appendix Table A4).  
As expected, physical inaccessibility to health care providers is an important 
deterrent. This is reflected not only in significant coefficients on travel time, but also 
in the importance of transport and access routes. Other aspects of the health facility 
infrastructure seems less important. In particular, it is noteworthy that neither the 
presence of a hospital in the district nor the proxy for health care quality has a 
significant impact on utilization. Economic status, as measured by per capita 
household consumption, does not have a significant impact on utilization. However, 
other variables relating to economic status, including whether there is a person in the 
household that has a profession and whether the woman in question has a profession 
are significant for at least one of the health services. This effect may, however, 
capture differences in health-related norms and values between professionals and 
nonprofessionals, rather than the effect of the household’s economic situation in a 
more narrow sense. The results further suggest that household structure and relations 
may play a role in decisions relating to health care. In the case of maternity care, 
being the daughter of the head appears to convey some privileges in terms of health 
service utilization. Similarly, children of the head of the household also appears to be 
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more likely to be immunized. There is also some evidence of a family size and birth 
order effect. Finally, service use appears to be systematically higher in urban areas, 
even after controlling for measured differences in access, quality, and household 
characteristics. Similarly, there are some important interprovincial differences that are 
not captured by the variation in the set of explanatory variables.
18 Both the effect of 
living in urban areas and the significant provincial fixed effects suggest that there are 
important unmeasured determinants of health service use. This may relate to 
unmeasured aspects of access, or spatial differences in health-related information, 
norms, and values.  
Turning to the impact of education on health care choices, we begin by 
considering the results based on the original specification of the education variable 
(education measured as highest grade attained for all household members). In 
particular, we consider the five single and joint hypotheses set out in Table 1 (test 
statistics are reported in full in Table 5). First, provided that the woman has a spouse 
residing in the household, his level of education appears to have a significant impact 
on some heath care decisions. Specifically, the marginal effect of the highest grade 
attained by the spouse is positive and significant in the Probit analysis of the woman’s 
decision to attend a pregnancy control and to immunize her child. Spousal education 
is, however, not a significant determinant in the woman’s choice of where to deliver 
her child. Second, with the exception of the decision to attend a pregnancy control, 
we can reject the hypothesis that the education of other household members does not 
have an impact on decision relating to maternal and child health. Third, we can also 
reject the hypothesis that the education of others matters beyond the level of 
education attained by the “other” household member with the highest level of 
education. In other words, the marginal effects of highest grade attained for Oth2 and 
Oth3 are not jointly significant. Finally, under the current specification, there is no 
statistically significant evidence that the impact of others’ education is different 
depending on whether that person is a man or a woman. This is the case whether we 
consider only Oth1, or joint hypotheses.  
These findings suggest that the education of both the woman’s spouse and 
other members of the household are important factors in decisions concerning 
maternal and child health care. However, as noted, the estimated coefficients are not 
very informative about the quantitative impact on estimated choice probabilities. In 
general both choice probabilities, the marginal effect of specific variables on the 
choice probabilities and the standard errors of predicted probabilities, depend on the 
full vector of independent variables (w). We assess the impact of the variables of 
interest on predicted choice probabilities at the means of the remaining independent 
variables, thereby controlling for the confounding effects of covariates.
19 In 
particular, for each of the education variables (own education, spousal education, and 
the education of the other household member with the highest level of education) we 
consider how choice probabilities change as the highest grade completed changes 
                                                 
18 In broad terms, individuals in the southern provinces (Maputo City, Maputo Province, Gaza, 
Inhambane), and to some extent Tete, are more likely to use maternity health services and to immunize 
their children. 
19 Both the marginal effect of the variable of interest and the standard error of predicted choice 
probabilities can vary considerably with the vector of independent variables. 15 
 
from no education to completed EP1 (grade 5), while holding the other education 
variables at their mean (see Table 6).
20  
Table 5. Test Statistics for Estimated Coefficients 
H0 Prob.  H0 is true (Chi2) 
SpouseEdu = 0  0.071 0.627 0.005 
Oth1Edu = 
Oth1Edu + (Oth1Edu x Female) = 
Oth2Edu = 
Oth2Edu + (Oth2Edu x Female) = 
Oth3Edu = 
Oth3Edu + (Oth3Edu x Female) = 0 
0.146 0.001 0.007 
Oth2Edu = 
Oth2Edu + (Oth2Edu x Female) = 
Oth3Edu = 
Oth3Edu + (Oth3Edu x Female) = 0 
0.934 0.351 0.578 
Oth1Edu x Female = 
Oth2Edu x Female = 
Oth3Edu x Female = 0 
0.902 0.258 0.315 
Oth2Edu x Female = 
Oth3Edu x Female = 0  0.753 0.424 0.526 
Statistics from Wald tests of single and joint hypotheses. 
 
As expected, the level of education of the woman has a big impact on the 
probability of using maternal and child health services. At the means of the other 
variables, there is a difference of approximately 0.2 in the predicted probabilities as 
the woman’s education increases from no education to completed primary. The high 
level of significance of own education is reflected in fairly narrow confidence 
intervals. Considering the case of women with an average level of education, spousal 
education has a fairly small impact on predicted probabilities, particularly in the case 
of institutional delivery. In contrast, the marginal effect of increasing education of 
other household members is notable. This is particularly the case for maternity care, 
where the probability of service use increases with 0.16 and 0.27, respectively, for 
pregnancy control and institutional delivery as the level of education of Oth1 goes 
from 0 to 5.  
                                                 
20 The impact of the respective education variables on predicted probabilities is described more 
fully in the appendix (Figure 2, Figure 3, and Figure 4). These graphs also illustrate that the potential 
importance of the indicator variables for spouse and other household members. The indicator variables 
permit the effect of the spouse or other household member not being present to differ from the effect of 
that person having no education. In some cases this distinction appears to be important. 16 
 
Table 6. Predicted Probabilities (with confidence intervals) 
  Relevant education variable = 0    Relevant education variable = 5 
  Predicted 
probability  CI   Predicted 
probability  CI 
Mother’s education
*         
Pregnancy control  0.60  (0.50, 0.70)    0.80  (0.71, 0.88) 
Institutional delivery  0.34  (0.26, 0.42)    0.54  (0.42, 0.66) 
Immunization 0.42  (0.34,  0.49)    0.56  (0.48,  0.64) 
Education of spouse
**          
Pregnancy control  0.64  (0.54, 0.74)    0.73  (0.66, 0.79) 
Institutional delivery  0.40  (0.29, 0.51)    0.43  (0.37, 0.50) 
Immunization 0.40  (0.33,  0.47)    0.50  (0.44,  0.55) 
Education of other
***          
Pregnancy control  0.62  (0.50, 0.72)    0.78  (0.65, 0.88) 
Institutional delivery  0.31  (0.23, 0.40)    0.58  (0.44, 0.70) 
Immunization 0.43  (0.35,  0.52)    0.52  (0.44,  0.61) 
* Predicted probs. calculated at means of all variables except own education. 
** Predicted probs. calculated at means of all variables, except Married=1, Spouse=1, and 
SpousEdu=0/5. 
*** Predicted probs. calculated at means of all variables, except Oth1=1, and Oth1Edu=0/5. 
 
Finally, we turn to the question of specification. So far, we have assumed that 
the impact of education can be represented as a weighted sum of the education of 
different household members. An alternative specification, where the education of the 
spouse and other household members is measured as the deviation from the woman’s 
education, may, however, be more appropriate. In order to address this question, the 
same model was estimated under this alternative specification.
21 The estimated 
coefficients on the controls in the analysis are broadly unchanged. There are, 
however, some changes in the coefficients on the education variables of interest. In 
particular, the coefficient on the woman’s own education increases, while the 
coefficients on spousal education and the education of the other person in the 
household with highest education increase slightly, or are broadly unchanged. Of 
course, spousal and “other” education is now measured as the deviation from the 
woman’s education. As a consequence, the variables will tend to take a lower value, 
and in cases where the woman has some education, the impact of spousal and “other” 
education on predicted choice probabilities may be lower than in the original 
specification even though the coefficients are higher. Notwithstanding these changes, 
the broad conclusions concerning the hypotheses of interest continue to hold. In other 
words, even under this alternative specification, there is a significant marginal effect 
of spousal education on the probability of attending pregnancy control and child 
immunization (provided the spouse has a higher level of education than the woman). 
Similarly, the hypothesis that the education of other household members has a 
significant impact on health care choices (institutional delivery and child 
immunizations) cannot be rejected. However, as before, the effect is confined to the 
person with the highest level of education. 
Although it is comforting that the main conclusions from the analysis are 
robust, it is natural to ask which specification is more appropriate. We address this 
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for the respective hypotheses concerning the coefficients of interest are reported in appendix Table A6. 17 
 
question in two ways. The first approach is based on testing whether the coefficients 
on the education variables of interest estimated over the subsample of women with no 
education are different from those estimated over the subsample of women with some 
education.
22 Although there is some ambiguity, the test statistics (Table A7) do not 
permit us to reject the hypothesis that the coefficients are the same across the 
subsamples (the hypothesis can be rejected only for spousal education in the case of 
child immunizations). Second, following Davidson and MacKinnon (1993), we also 
explore a more direct approach to test for the appropriateness of an alternative 
specification with a rival set of conditioning variables. The test asks whether there is 
any statistically significant evidence of departure from the null hypothesis in the 
direction of an alternative hypothesis. The results provide evidence in favor of the 
alternative specification in the case of pregnancy control, but not for the other health 
care choices (Table A8). In summary, the specification tests are inconclusive. They 
suggest that the rival specification of the relevant education variable may be more 
appropriate for some education variables, or in explaining some choices. There is, 
however, no basis for unambiguously favoring one specification over the other. 
6.  Summary and Conclusion 
This paper has focused on the role of intrahousehold education externalities in 
health care choices. Its central premise is that health service use is determined not 
solely by an individual’s own education, but rather by some notion of effective 
education, which incorporates the educational attainment of other household 
members. The paper sets out a general framework for representing education 
externalities and proposes a number of specific hypotheses concerning the way in 
which the education of different household members impacts on health care choices. 
These hypotheses were tested on data from Mozambique, focusing on maternity 
services and child immunizations. We can draw five major conclusions from the 
analysis.  
First, while own/maternal education seems to be the education variable of 
primary importance for the health care choices under consideration, the education of 
other household members does have a significant and sometimes large effect. 
Importantly, it is not only the education of the spouse that matters, but also the 
education of other individuals residing in the household. Indeed, the marginal effect 
of education is greater for the nonspouse household member with the highest level of 
education than for the spouse. These findings appear robust to the how the education 
variable is specified. Second, the analysis suggests that while the education of the 
person (nonspouse) in the household with the highest-level education is important, the 
level of education of additional household members does not have an impact on 
health care choices. Third, the data provide no evidence of a gender difference in 
education externalities. In other words, the impact of the education of nonspouse 
household members on health care decisions seems to be the same regardless of 
whether they are men or women. Fourth, we examine the merits of two alternative 
representations of the education externality. In the original representation, education 
is measured as the highest grade completed. In the alternative specification, the 
educational attainment of other household members is measured as the deviation from 
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set of independent variables constructed by interacting all the original variables (including the 
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the woman’s education. We are unable to conclude unambiguously in favor of one 
specification over the other. Finally, although the analysis highlights the importance 
of both education (broadly conceived) and a number of other explanatory variables in 
understanding health care choices, spatial fixed effects remain highly significant. 
Important questions hence remain about why health service indicators differ so 
markedly across provinces and urban/rural areas in Mozambique. 
The analysis leaves a number of issues unresolved, thus pointing the direction 
for future research on this issue. The most obvious point to note is that although we 
have established the presence of education externalities, we have not shed much light 
on the channels by which these effects arise. In part, this is due to the use of a 
composite variable (highest grade attained) to proxy for the complex set of values, 
norms, information, and cognitive abilities that ultimately determine behavior. The 
disentangling of the relative importance of norms, values, and beliefs on health care 
choices (and the role of education in shaping these individual attributes) is clearly an 
important research agenda. The focus on intrahousehold dynamics in health care 
choices also highlights the potential role that education plays in changing the relative 
autonomy and bargaining power of different household members. Although this issue 




Table A1. Description of variables 
Dlvry_cont  Indicator variable for whether woman who delivered child in last 12 moths attended a pregnancy 
control at some point during her pregnancy 
Dlvry_inst  Indicator variable for whether woman who delivered child in last 12 moths did so with medical 
supervision in a health facility 
Vacc_comp  Indicator variable for whether child (older than 12 months but younger than 5 years) has received a 
complete set of immunizations 
Time  Travel time in minutes from village to closest health centre or health post 
Time_sq  Travel time squared 
Inaccess  Indicator variable for whether the community is inaccessible. A community is considered inaccessible 
if (i) road to community is not passable throughout the year, and (ii) there is no regular collective 
transport to and from the community. 
PubSpend  District-level proxy for health care quality: deviation from norm on public spending on health, where 
norm is based on infrastructure, staffing, and activity level in district. 
Hospital  Indicator variable for whether there is a hospital (central, provincial, general, or rural) in the district. 
Urban  Indicator variable for whether the household is residing in an urban area 
Income  Indicator for socioeconomic status, measured by per capital household consumption, where 
consumption has been deflated by a spatial price index. 
Prof_in_HH  Indicator variable for whether someone in the household has a profession. 
HH_size  Numer of household members 
Age  Age of woman 
Age_sq  Age of woman squared 
Daughter  Indicator variable for whether the woman is the daughter of the head of household 
Married  Indicator variable for whether the woman is married 
Wom_works  Indicator variable for whether the woman is currently working 
Wom_prof  Indicator variable for whether the woman has a profession 
Child_of_head  Indicator variable for whether the child (in case of immunizations) is a child of the head of household 
First_child  Indicator variable for whether the child (in case of immunizations) is the first child of woman 
WomEdu  Highest grade of schooling completed by woman (mother or guardian of child in case of 
immunizations). 
Spouse  Indicator variable for whether the woman has a spouse that is residing in the household 
SpouseEdu  Highest grade of schooling completed by spouse (equal to zero of no spouse or spouse not residing 
in household) 
Oth1  Indicator variable for whether there is another person (>13 years) residing in the household 
Oth1Edu  Highest grade of schooling completed by the “other” person with the highest level of schooling (equal 
to zero if there are no “other” persons residing in the household 
Oth1Edu x Female  Interaction variable: Oth1Edu interacted with whether Oth1 is a woman 
Oth2  Indicator variable for whether there is another person (>13 years) residing in the household (except 
for Oth1) 
Oth2Edu  Highest grade of schooling completed by the “other” person with the highest level of schooling (equal 
to zero if there are no “other” persons residing in the household aside from Oth1 
Oth2Edu x Female  Interaction variable: Oth2Edu interacted with whether Oth2 is a woman 
Oth3  Indicator variable for whether there is another person (>13 years) residing in the household (except 
for Oth1 and Oth2) 
Oth3Edu  Highest grade of schooling completed by the “other” person with the highest level of schooling (equal 
to zero if there are no “other” persons residing in the household aside from Oth1 and Oth2 
Oth3Edu x Female  Interaction variable: Oth3Edu interacted with whether Oth3 is a woman 20 
 
Table A2. Variable Values (maternity care subsample) 
Variable Mean  S.D.  Min  0.25  Mdn  0.75  Max 
Time 137.21  246.20  3.00  15.00  60.00  150.00  4,320.00 
Time_sq  79,400.12 540,118.99  9.00  225.00 3,600.00 22,500.00 18,662,400.00 
Inaccess 0.26  0.44  0.00  0.00  0.00  1.00  1.00 
PubSpend -0.03  0.31  -1.45  -0.15  -0.03  0.16  0.53 
Hospital 0.43  0.50  0.00  0.00  0.00  1.00  1.00 
Urban 0.20  0.40  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  1.00 
Income 8.24  0.63  5.93  7.85  8.24  8.65  10.75 
Prof_in_HH 0.21  0.41  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  1.00 
HH_size 6.17  2.93  1.00  4.00  6.00  8.00  23.00 
Age 26.83  7.47  13.00  21.00  25.00  31.00  60.00 
Age_sq 775.43  450.64  169.00  441.00  625.00  961.00  3,600.00 
Daughter 0.11  0.32  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  1.00 
Married 0.87  0.33  0.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00 
Wom_works 0.52  0.50  0.00  0.00  1.00  1.00  1.00 
Wom_prof 0.03  0.17  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  1.00 
WomEdu 1.12  1.37  0.00  0.00  0.00  2.16  5.01 
Spouse 0.80  0.40  0.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00 
SpouseEdu 1.61  1.51  0.00  0.00  1.63  2.64  7.27 
SpouseEdu’ 1.04  1.21  0.00  0.00  0.00  2.16  5.69 
Oth1 0.56  0.50  0.00  0.00  1.00  1.00  1.00 
Oth1Edu 1.10  1.46  0.00  0.00  0.00  2.16  6.02 
Oth1Edu’ 0.64  1.07  0.00  0.00  0.00  1.00  5.01 
Oth1Edu x Female  0.37  0.98  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  5.69 
Oth1Edu x Female’  0.18  0.61  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  5.01 
Oth2 0.38  0.49  0.00  0.00  0.00  1.00  1.00 
Oth2Edu 0.57  1.11  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  5.69 
Oth2Edu’ 0.26  0.71  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  4.29 
Oth2Edu x Female  0.27  0.83  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  5.01 
Oth2Edu x Female’  0.11  0.47  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  3.91 
Oth3 0.24  0.43  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  1.00 
Oth3Edu 0.29  0.82  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  5.01 
Oth3Edu’ 0.10  0.46  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  4.29 
Oth3Edu x Female  0.14  0.59  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  5.01 
Oth3Edu x Female’  0.04  0.29  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  3.51 
Provin=Cabo 
Delgado  0.08 0.27  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  1.00 
Provin=Nampula 0.20  0.40  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  1.00 
Provin=Zambezia 0.23  0.42  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 1.00 
Provin=Tete 0.08  0.28  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  1.00 
Provin=Manica 0.07  0.26  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  1.00 
Provin=Sofala 0.08  0.27  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  1.00 
Provin=Inhambane 0.07  0.25  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  1.00 
Provin=Gaza 0.05  0.23  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  1.00 
Provin=Maputo 0.04  0.20  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  1.00 
Provin=Maputo 
Cidade  0.05 0.23  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  1.00 
N  =  1,584             
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Table A3. Variable Values (immunization sub-sample) 
Variable Mean  S.D.  Min  0.25  Mdn  0.75  Max 
Time 134.14  248.33  3.00  15.00 45.00  150.00  4,320.00 
Time_sq 79,642.89  546,023.68  9.00  225.00 2,025.00  22,500.00  18,662,400.00 
Inaccess 0.24  0.43  0.00  0.00 0.00  0.00  1.00 
PubSpend -0.03  0.32  -1.45  -0.15 -0.03  0.16  0.53 
Hospital 0.47  0.50  0.00  0.00 0.00  1.00  1.00 
Urban 0.21  0.41  0.00  0.00 0.00  0.00  1.00 
Income 8.24  0.66  5.70  7.83 8.21  8.63  11.37 
Prof_in_HH 0.22  0.42  0.00  0.00 0.00  0.00  1.00 
HH_size 6.33  2.64  2.00  4.00 6.00  8.00  23.00 
Age 29.77  8.77  8.00  23.00 28.00  35.00  98.00 
Age_sq 963.14  625.58  64.00  529.00 784.00  1,225.00  9,604.00 
Married 0.25  0.43  0.00  0.00 0.00  0.00  1.00 
Wom_works 0.53  0.50  0.00  0.00 1.00  1.00  1.00 
Wom_prof 0.03  0.16  0.00  0.00 0.00  0.00  1.00 
Child_of_head 0.83  0.38  0.00  1.00 1.00  1.00 1.00 
First_child 0.24  0.42  0.00  0.00 0.00  0.00  1.00 
WomEdu 1.02  1.31  0.00  0.00 0.00  2.16  5.01 
Spouse 0.80  0.40  0.00  1.00 1.00  1.00  1.00 
SpouseEdu 1.59  1.53  0.00  0.00 1.63  2.64  8.43 
SpouseEdu’ 1.06  1.22  0.00  0.00 0.00  2.16  5.69 
Oth1 0.62  0.49  0.00  0.00 1.00  1.00  1.00 
Oth1Edu 1.16  1.48  0.00  0.00 0.00  2.64  7.27 
Oth1Edu’ 0.73  1.16  0.00  0.00 0.00  1.63  6.02 
Oth1Edu x Female  0.42  1.00  0.00  0.00 0.00  0.00  5.69 
Oth1Edu x 
Female’  0.24 0.71  0.00  0.00 0.00  0.00  4.66 
Oth2 0.40  0.49  0.00  0.00 0.00  1.00  1.00 
Oth2Edu 0.59  1.13  0.00  0.00 0.00  0.00  5.69 
Oth2Edu’ 0.32  0.80  0.00  0.00 0.00  0.00  4.29 
Oth2Edu x Female  0.26  0.81  0.00  0.00 0.00  0.00  5.69 
Oth2Edu x 
Female’  0.13 0.52  0.00  0.00 0.00  0.00  3.91 
Oth3 0.25  0.43  0.00  0.00 0.00  0.00  1.00 
Oth3Edu 0.29  0.82  0.00  0.00 0.00  0.00  5.36 
Oth3Edu’ 0.13  0.53  0.00  0.00 0.00  0.00  3.91 
Oth3Edu x Female  0.14  0.60  0.00  0.00 0.00  0.00  5.36 
Oth3Edu x 
Female’  0.06 0.36  0.00  0.00 0.00  0.00  3.91 
Provin=Cabo 
Delgado  0.08 0.27  0.00  0.00 0.00  0.00  1.00 
Provin=Nampula 0.19  0.39  0.00  0.00 0.00  0.00  1.00 
Provin=Zambezia 0.21 0.41  0.00  0.00 0.00  0.00  1.00 
Provin=Tete 0.08  0.27  0.00  0.00 0.00  0.00  1.00 
Provin=Manica 0.07  0.26  0.00  0.00 0.00  0.00 1.00 
Provin=Sofala 0.09  0.29  0.00  0.00 0.00  0.00  1.00 
Provin=Inhambane 0.07  0.25  0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00  1.00 
Provin=Gaza 0.06  0.23  0.00  0.00 0.00  0.00  1.00 
Provin=Maputo 0.05  0.22  0.00  0.00 0.00  0.00 1.00 
Provin=Maputo 
Cidade  0.05 0.22  0.00  0.00 0.00  0.00  1.00 
N = 3,647             
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Table A4. Probit Results (education as highest grade attained) 
  Pregnancy control  Institutional delivery  Complete immunizations 
  coeff.  z-values  coeff.  z-values  coeff.  z-values 
Time  -0.002  [4.19]**  -0.002  [3.66]**  -0.001  [3.45]** 
Time_sq  0.000  [3.18]**  0.000  [3.16]**  0.000  [2.29]* 
Inaccess  -0.392  [2.50]*  -0.444  [2.96]**  -0.259  [2.51]* 
PubSpend  -0.402  [1.52]  0.458  [1.90]  -0.156  [0.93] 
Hospital  -0.028  [0.18]  -0.142  [1.00]  -0.163  [1.69] 
Urban  0.421  [1.19]  0.592  [2.94]**  0.435  [2.79]** 
Income  0.028  [0.27]  0.127  [1.34]  -0.034  [0.54] 
Prof_in_HH  0.478  [2.99]**  0.289  [1.87]  0.155  [1.63] 
HH_size  -0.006  [0.19]  -0.009  [0.31]  -0.058  [2.70]** 
Age  0.068  [1.52]  0.042  [0.92]  -0.006  [0.33] 
Age_sq  -0.001  [1.58]  -0.001  [1.15]  0.000  [0.29] 
Daughter  0.450  [2.28]*  0.277  [1.72]     
Married  0.490  [2.24]*  -0.016  [0.08]  -0.009  [0.11] 
Wom_works  0.091  [0.75]  0.109  [0.98]  0.042  [0.55] 
Wom_prof  1.197  [2.56]*  0.608  [1.87]  -0.098  [0.46] 
Child_of_head          0.280  [3.03]** 
First_child          0.142  [1.70] 
WomEdu  0.196  [4.14]**  0.168  [3.00]**  0.116  [3.99]** 
Spouse  -0.438  [2.07]*  0.212  [0.95]  -0.172  [1.64] 
SpouseEdu  0.077  [1.80]  0.029  [0.49]  0.082  [2.84]** 
Oth1  0.093  [0.56]  -0.030  [0.20]  0.121  [0.99] 
Oth1Edu  0.154  [2.14]*  0.226  [3.31]**  0.076  [1.85] 
Oth1Edu  x  Female  0.000  [0.00]  0.080  [1.44]  0.041  [1.06] 
Oth2  -0.232  [1.23]  -0.185  [0.89]  -0.163  [1.18] 
Oth2Edu  0.057  [0.45]  -0.017  [0.14]  0.023  [0.37] 
Oth2Edu  x  Female  -0.043  [0.42]  0.015  [0.20]  0.060  [1.10] 
Oth3  -0.608  [2.53]*  -0.019  [0.10]  0.153  [1.28] 
Oth3Edu  0.054  [0.25]  -0.183  [1.63]  0.052  [0.66] 
Oth3Edu  x  Female  -0.128  [0.72]  0.128  [1.30]  -0.022  [0.29] 
Provin=Cabo  Delgado  -0.139  [0.47]  -0.469  [1.84]  -0.174  [0.89] 
Provin=Nampula  -0.370  [1.50]  -0.245  [1.05]  -0.330  [1.83] 
Provin=Zambezia  0.128  [0.53]  0.329  [1.43]  -0.432  [2.12]* 
Provin=Tete  0.508  [2.15]*  0.460  [2.00]*  0.970  [4.88]** 
Provin=Manica  0.252  [0.92]  0.245  [0.93]  0.064  [0.31] 
Provin=Sofala  0.470  [1.78]  0.340  [1.41]  0.302  [1.54] 
Provin=Inhambane  -0.084  [0.33]  0.578  [2.36]*  0.876  [4.25]** 
Provin=Gaza  0.642  [1.41]  0.456  [1.36]  0.887  [4.50]** 
Provin=Maputo  1.482  [3.85]**  0.865  [3.11]**  1.207  [3.65]** 
Provin=Maputo  Cidade      0.490  [1.53]  1.007  [2.89]** 
Constant  -1.209  [0.99]  -2.368  [2.15]*  0.000  [0.00] 
Observations  1412    1584    3645   
lnL  -730.92    -781.82    -1886.91   
lnL_0  -938.02    -
1067.51     -2511.10   
Note: Dummy variable for Niassa province excluded throughout. Observations from Maputo City excluded 
in case of pregnancy control because of perfect prediction. All estimates take into account sample weights 
and within-cluster correlation. Robust z statistics in brackets (* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%). 
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Table A5. Probit Results (education as deviation from woman’s grade) 
  Pregnancy control  Institutional delivery  Complete immunizations 
  coeff.   z-values  coeff.  z-values  coeff.  z-values 
Time  -0.002   [4.19]**  -0.002  [3.63]**  -0.001  [3.35]** 
Time_sq  0.000   [3.09]**  0.000  [3.14]**  0.000  [2.20]* 
Inaccess  -0.392   [2.51]*  -0.420  [2.84]**  -0.255  [2.46]* 
PubSpend  -0.419   [1.56]  0.442  [1.85]  -0.159  [0.95] 
Hospital  -0.029   [0.18]  -0.133  [0.94]  -0.168  [1.74] 
Urban  0.447   [1.28]  0.591  [3.03]**  0.456  [2.91]** 
Income  0.038   [0.36]  0.147  [1.52]  -0.029  [0.45] 
Prof_in_HH  0.483   [3.07]**  0.270  [1.84]  0.164  [1.77] 
HH_size  -0.001   [0.03]  -0.013  [0.46]  -0.044  [2.28]* 
Age  0.071   [1.61]  0.048  [1.03]  -0.006  [0.30] 
Age_sq  -0.001   [1.66]  -0.001  [1.24]  0.000  [0.33] 
Daughter  0.465   [2.42]*  0.249  [1.57]     
Married  0.500   [2.28]*  -0.006  [0.03]  -0.024  [0.31] 
Wom_works  0.097   [0.80]  0.104  [0.95]  0.037  [0.49] 
Wom_prof  1.234   [2.63]**  0.595  [1.92]  -0.075  [0.36] 
Child_of_head           0.271  [2.95]** 
First_child           0.153  [1.89] 
WomEdu  0.293   [5.76]**  0.276  [5.50]**  0.218  [6.34]** 
Spouse  -0.429   [2.06]*  0.180  [0.94]  -0.160  [1.77] 
SpouseEdu’  0.100   [2.19]*  0.056  [0.92]  0.105  [3.60]** 
Oth1  0.148   [0.90]  0.102  [0.69]  0.135  [1.22] 
Oth1Edu’  0.144   [1.78]  0.227  [2.56]*  0.083  [1.94] 
Oth1Edu  x  Female’  -0.027   [0.31]  0.063  [0.66]  0.069  [1.39] 
Oth2 -0.239    [1.29]  -0.139   [0.77]  -0.154  [1.21] 
Oth2Edu’  0.167   [1.05]  0.022  [0.16]  -0.012  [0.17] 
Oth2Edu  x  Female’  -0.057   [0.42]  0.011  [0.10]  0.109  [1.38] 
Oth3  -0.558   [2.35]*  -0.096  [0.49]  0.193  [1.68] 
Oth3Edu’  -0.223   [0.93]  -0.139  [0.99]  0.032  [0.29] 
Oth3Edu  x  Female’  0.063   [0.31]  0.254  [1.58]  -0.142  [1.13] 
Provin=Cabo  Delgado  -0.154   [0.52]  -0.469  [1.83]  -0.196  [1.01] 
Provin=Nampula  -0.377   [1.53]  -0.246  [1.05]  -0.335  [1.84] 
Provin=Zambezia  0.128   [0.53]  0.336  [1.45]  -0.430  [2.13]* 
Provin=Tete  0.523   [2.20]*  0.463  [1.98]*  0.970  [4.86]** 
Provin=Manica  0.279   [0.98]  0.226  [0.86]  0.037  [0.18] 
Provin=Sofala  0.470   [1.77]  0.328  [1.35]  0.293  [1.51] 
Provin=Inhambane  -0.054   [0.21]  0.602  [2.44]*  0.885  [4.35]** 
Provin=Gaza  0.668   [1.49]  0.472  [1.38]  0.874  [4.41]** 
Provin=Maputo  1.465   [3.85]**  0.857  [3.11]**  1.179  [3.60]** 
Provin=Maputo  Cidade       0.479  [1.46]  1.087  [3.37]** 
Constant  -1.454   [1.21]  -2.720  [2.40]*  -0.199  [0.31] 
Observations  1412     1584    3645   
lnL  -730.04     -780.16    -1884.26   
lnL_0  -938.02     -1067.51    -2511.10   
Note: Dummy variable for Niassa province excluded throughout. Observations from Maputo City excluded 
in case of pregnancy control because of perfect prediction. All estimates take into account sample 
weights and within-cluster correlation. Robust z statistics in brackets (* significant at 5%; ** significant at 
1%). 
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Table A6. Test statistics for Estimated Coefficients (education as deviation) 
H0 Prob.  H0 is true (Chi2) 
 Preg.  cont.  Inst.  dlvry.  Immun. 
Oth2Edu’ = 
Oth2Edu’ + (Oth2Edu’ x Female) = 
Oth3Edu’ = 
Oth3Edu’ + (Oth3Edu’ x Female) = 0 
0.814 0.628  0.448 
Oth1Edu’ x Female = 
Oth2Edu’ x Female = 
Oth3Edu’ x Female = 0 
0.943 0.331  0.065 
Oth2Edu’ x Female = 
Oth3Edu’ x Female = 0  0.847 0.282  0.163 
Statistics from Wald tests of single and joint hypotheses. 
 
Table A7. Test of Coefficient Equality across Subsamples 
H0:  coefficients estimated over sub-sample of 
women with no education are equal to 
those estimated over sub-sample of 
women with some education 
Prob. H0 is true (Chi2) 
  Preg. cont.  Inst. dlvry.  Immun. 
Spouse_edu 0.977  0.221  0.023 
Oth1_edu 0.437  0.174  0.224 
Oth1_edu 
Oth1_edu + (Oth1Edu x Female)  0.549 0.373  0.353 
 
Table A8. Test of Alternative Non-nested Specification 
H0: the alternative set of conditioning variables (education measured as 




Pregnancy control  0.518 
Institutional delivery  0.019 
Child immunizations  0.015 
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